Introduction
In Greece, 83% of agricultural land is in Less-Favoured Areas (LFA) where 29% of the population lives. Agriculture in LFA is the main activity consisting of extensive systems of olive and vine growing (Hellenic Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food, 2007) .
Viticulture has contributed to the cultural and economic life of these areas creating landscapes of great aesthetic value. However, during the last 15 years, viticulture is being abandoned, as farmers take up other employment. The consequences of abandonment include a reduction of grape supply to the winemaking industry and important impacts on the social and economic structures of the LFA. Amongst the main threats to viticulture land use in LFA are low productivity and tourism infrastructure (Tzanopoulos et al., 2011; Kizos et al., 2009 ) along with low grape prices, high labour demands and seasonality of employment demand (Papadopoulos and Papanikos, 2005) .
However, in recent years, traditional vine-growing has gained importance again as a change in lifestyle of the urban population has created a revived demand for traditional landscapes and ways of life (Fleskens et al., 2009) . Also, as a result of the global economic crisis, Greek households are facing economic challenges, leading residents of LFA to return to farming and vine-growing (Kassimis and Papadopoulos, 2013) .
In an attempt to maintain the rural population, the EU's Rural Development Policy was designed to provide opportunities to farmers in LFA. These opportunities include the promotion of multifunctional activities. The EU Rural Development Policy was implemented in Greece by the Rural Development Program for Greece, 2007 Greece, -2013 . Three schemes were included in this program for the vine-growing sector: an investment aid scheme that compensates up to 80% of an investment made to improve farm infrastructure; a subsidy for the adoption of organic practices compensating growers for income losses from being organic; and a subsidy scheme for investment in agro-tourist activities, paying up to 80% of investment made on non-farming activities on farm. These schemes were on a voluntary basis and subject to the rules of eligibility of the Rural Development Programme for Greece. These measures were seen as crucial for the sector, but the adoption rate has not been as high as expected by policy makers (Karanikolas and Martinos, 2007 ). An investigation into the first two of these schemes is reported here.
Previous studies on the Greek agricultural sector have revealed that one of the country's major problems is associated with institutional structure including corruption. Specifically for agriculture, in any transaction with the authorities, farmers' ability to approach and influence the institutional system could be difficult due to institutional corruption. Institutional corruption in Greece is a complex social issue, which is led by financial motives and pro-cessed through social interactions between farmers and authorities and the interference of agencies and informal political networks (Louloudis et al., 2000; Vounouki, 2004; Karanikolas and Martinos, 2007; Barrio and Vounouki, 2003) . Implementation of agricultural policies is perceived by the public as subject to corruption and political interests and dependent on fragmented, clientelist and uneven social protection which is often facilitated by the complicated legislative framework (Kourliouros et al., 2006; Karanikolas and Hatzipanteli, 2010; Monastiriotis and Antoniades, 2009) .
The economic recession caused by the ongoing Greek Government's debt crisis has had great financial and social consequences at both the individual and sectorial levels, including the agricultural and rural sector. The resultant austerity measures have led to reduced farm incomes and product prices and reduced access to credit. The budget for funding rural development has also been reduced and farmers are less willing to take investment risks (Hellenic Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food, 2012) .
The success of multifunctional agricultural schemes depends on farmers participating in them. Most research on farmers' willingness to participate in multifunctional schemes in Europe has focused on agrienvironmental schemes. Four different approaches emerge from such literature: the financial approach where farmers' decisions are based on profit maximization (Sintori et al., 2009; Genious et al., 2006; Bougherara and Latruffe, 2010) ; the spatial approach that examines farmers' intentions from a geographical view (Wilson, 2009; Lange et al., 2013) ; the social demographic approach where decision making is based on demographic and structural characteristics of the farms and on the nature of the measure to be adopted (Tore, 2003; Mathijs, 2003; Broch et al., 2012; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002) ; and the behavioural approach that investigates farmers' behaviour, views and attitudes on key aspects associated with agri-environmental schemes (Blackstock et al., 2010; Burton et al., 2008; Rehman et al., 2007; Emery and Franks, 2012; Ingram et al., 2013) . Some previous behavioural studies have also combined psychological aspects and farm characteristics when investigating farmers' decision making at the individual level (Mattison and Norris, 2007; Läpple and Kelley, 2013; Gorton et al., 2008; de Lauwere et al., 2011; Areal et al., 2012; Hansson et al., 2012; de Graaff et al., 2010) .
In Greece, Papadopoulos and Papanikos (2005) examined the labour allocation preferences of vinegrowing households on a Greek island and Oxouzi (2008) investigated the adoption of organic viticulture in Central Macedonia with the focus being on economic and demographic factors, and not on farmer's attitudes and behaviours.
Here, we use an integrated approach that combines socio-economic, geographical, agricultural and psychological aspects to investigate farmers' intention to participate in two multifunctional schemes, an investment aid scheme and a subsidy scheme for the adoption of organic practices, as well as a set of potential drivers behind farmers' intention. We incorporate three novel aspects, farmers' perception of institutional corruption, farmers' perception of economic recession, and farming systems into our analysis of intention to participate in the schemes. Perception of corruption is a factor that has not been incorporated before in behavioural studies of farmers. Similarly, perception of the ongoing economic recession is used here for the first time. Although farm structural characteristics are often incorporated in this type of analysis, we focused on identifying specific vine-growing systems to both examine their influence on farmers' willingness to participate in agricultural schemes and use them as control variables. Farming systems within LFA are quite diverse and depend on factors such as tradition, terrain and resources available and the purpose of the vineyard. We classified farms based on their characteristics, purposes, structure, intensity and farm household characteristics. Our analysis enables us to discuss policy tools that could increase vine-growers' participation in these schemes making them more efficient. This paper is organized as follows. First, the methodology used is explained, including a description of the data collection method and an explanation of the econometric analysis of farmers' willingness to participate in the two schemes. Then, the results of the analyses are presented and discussed. Finally, some conclusions are made.
Methodology

Conceptual framework
We use the framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), developed by Ajzen (1991) to help explain human behaviour as a "starting point" to frame the problem. Thus, an individual's intention to participate in a scheme is based on the farmer's prior beliefs about the scheme. An individual's overall belief com-prise behavioural, normative and control beliefs. In this context: behavioural beliefs are an individual's personal beliefs about the consequences of participating in the agricultural scheme; normative beliefs are an individual's perception of social pressure to participate or not in the scheme; whereas control beliefs refer to the individual's perceived ease or difficulty of participating in the scheme. A number of statements on potential farmers' views about the scheme were evaluated by farmers and grouped into a number of components using non-linear PCA. This enabled us to use these new constructs in the analysis of farmers' intention to participate in the schemes.
Since we were interested in investigating how specific factors, such as farmers' perception of institutional corruption, farmers' perception of the economic crisis as well as farmers' views about the future and local characteristics of the environment in which the farm is located (i.e. the agricultural system of the farm) may affect farmers' intention to participate in the schemes, we incorporated them along with socio-demographic aspects and farmers' experience of participating in similar schemes into our conceptual framework (Fig. 1). 
Survey
Three Greek areas with substantial vine-growing activity were selected for study: the mountain area of Ioannina; the island of Samos; and the coastal area of Kavala. They represent three types of LFA in Greece -mountains, islands and areas with special handicaps, as designated in EU Regulation (EC) 1698/2005.
The survey of vine-growers took place between July and September 2012. A total of 204, randomly chosen, vine-growers participated. The survey used an anonymous questionnaire. The questionnaire design was partially based on information obtained from a series of in-depth interviews with 18 farmers and an agronomist that took place prior to the survey.
The questionnaire was divided into three sections. First, questions on demographic and farm characteristics aimed at collecting information for the identification and classification of vine-growing systems. The second section collected information on farmers' intention to continue vine-growing and to participate in the two schemes or not. In the third section, participants were asked to evaluate on a 5-step scale a number of statements designed to reveal their perception of the schemes and their attitudes towards them. More specifically, farmers evaluated: The statements on farmers' views and attitudes were based on information derived from the qualitative analysis of the interviews and were designed to capture the three dimensions in the TPB (personal beliefs, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control). Specific statements were made for each agricultural scheme based on the information obtained from the in-depth interviews.
Thus, for the investment aid scheme, participants had to evaluate 17 statements regarding personal beliefs, 5 statements regarding subjective norms and 8 statements regarding perceived behavioural control. For the organic vine-growing scheme, participants had to evaluate 14 statements on personal beliefs, 5 statements on subjective norms and 8 statements on perceived behavioural control. The statements used for both schemes and their relation to each of the TPB factors are presented in Appendix A Tables A.1 and A.2.
Statistical analysis
Information from the survey was simplified using non-linear principal component analysis (PCA), a data reduction methodology that functions in the same way as factor analysis, but can incorporate categorical variables by transforming them into numeric ones (Linting et al., 2007) . The outcome of a nonlinear PCA, is a reduced number of variables (or principal components) that are correlated with the original dataset but uncorrelated to each other. The main difference between traditional PCA and nonlinear PCA is that the results of the latter are not nested, meaning that the eigen-values change as the number of components in the analysis change (Linting et al., 2007) . Therefore, the criterion followed to select the number of components was the Cronbach's alpha coefficient criterion which measures the degree to which a set of observations measure a component and can be used to describe the reliability of factors extracted (Manisera et al., 2010; Gliem and Gliem, 2003) . A threshold of coefficient value being 0.5 was chosen. The components that had a Cronbach's a >0.5, also had an eigen-value greater than 2. The eigen-value > 2 was used as an extension of the Kaiser (1958) criterion for selecting underlying components to confirm the validity of the choice of number of components (Jongeneel et al., 2008) .
Three non-linear PCA were conducted on: the variables describing the vine-growing systems; the evaluation of behavioural statements reflecting farmers' views and attitudes towards the investment aid scheme; and the evaluation of behavioural statements reflecting farmers' views and attitudes toward the organic vine-growing scheme. For identification of vine-growing systems a non-linear PCA was performed on variables related to vineyard and farm management characteristics, derived from the first section of the questionnaire. This enabled the identification of 6 vine-growing systems (Table 1) . (The results of the PCA and the factor loadings are presented in Appendix B Table B.1.) The non-linear PCA performed on behavioural statements related to participating in the investment aid scheme yielded three factors: financial; idealism; and perceived behavioural control ( Table 2 ). The non-linear PCA performed on farmers' views and attitudes towards the organic vine-growing subsidy scheme also produced three factors (Table 3) . The results of the PCA were used as numerical variables in the estimation models. For ease of interpretation, they were normalized on a scale from 0 to 10 (Areal et al., 2012) .
As shown in Table 2 , the first factor (Financial_imp) reflects personal attitudes to economic issues and describes farmers that are interested in the financial aspect of receiving a subsidy for investing in their vineyards. It also includes statements relating to peer pressure for having a good vineyard to the perceived social views on receiving a subsidy. The second factor (Idealists_imp) is about personal attitudes relating to the value of the environment and landscape and to the development of viticulture and it describes farmers that are more interested in the importance of their vine-yards for issues other than profit making. It includes one statement relating to social interaction. The third factor (Control imp) relates to perceived behavioural control and describes farmers that find it easy to apply for a subsidy, collaborate with the authorities and understand the relevant procedures.
As shown in Table 3 , the first factor (Financial_org), again, describes economic related personal attitudes and describes farmers that are concerned with the profit-cost relationship emerging from receiving a subsidy for being organic. It, too, also includes the statements relating to social pressure for having a good vineyard and to the social views on receiving a subsidy. The second factor (Idealists_org) describes farmers that are interested in the importance of organic farming on non-profit aspects like environ-mental protection and the development of viticulture and the area and also have interests outside farming. This factor includes statements on social norm that describe the interaction of farmers with each other and society. Similarly to the previous scheme, the third factor (Control_org) relates to perceived behavioural control and describes farmers that have no difficulties collaborating with the authorities and applying for a subsidy.
The incorporation of the results of the non-linear PCA analyses results in the conceptual framework of the study being adapted as presented in Fig. 2 .
A variable on perception of corruption was generated by asking participants to evaluate, on a 5-step Likert scale, the level of corruption in the bureaucratic procedures for each scheme (with 1 = very low and 5 = very high). Farmers perceiving high/low levels of corruption within the bureaucratic procedures were expected to have a negative/positive effect on willingness to participate in the schemes.
Two additional variables accounting for farmers' perception of the economic recession were also included. The first described farmers' perception of the impact of the recession on their activities and they were asked to evaluate the impact of the recession on the viticulture sector. The second was associated with the belief that the situation of the vine-growing sector will improve in the future and was generated by asking the farmers their agreement or not to this statement. We expected that farmers who were optimistic about the future would be more willing to participate in either of the study schemes than would those who were pessimistic.
A dummy variable on previous participation in each study scheme was also included as it was expected that vine-growers who had experience in participating in schemes would be more likely to participate again than vine-growers without such experience. Finally, farmers' education level and age were used as demographic variables.
Estimation
Examination of factors influencing farmers' willingness to participate in the schemes studied was based on Random Utility Theory, i.e. vine-growers would choose to participate in a scheme if this (Greene, 2004) . However, according to Greene and Hensher (2010) , adoption of an innovation is not a completely random process as farmers self-select themselves into treatment. Therefore, before examining their willingness to participate in a scheme, participants were first selected according to their willingness to continue vine-growing and only likely continuers were assessed for their willingness to participate in the schemes. In order to account for this, a selection utility equation was added to the model of Eq. (1), so that it takes the following form:
where e ij are the normally distributed error terms, β1 is a vector of parameters to be estimated in the model of the first equation, β2 is a vector of parameters to be estimated in the model of the second equation, with
For this model the conditional probability is:
Given the fact that intentions of vine growers to continue has a binary response (yes or no) 1 and the willingness of a vine-grower 1 More details on the variables and the results of the sample selection model can be found in the Appendix.2 All explanatory variables used in all models were checked for statistical significance through x 2 tests for discrete variables and a one sample t-test for continuous ones. Also, to account for multicollinearity, correlation matrices for all explanatory variables and V.I.F. indexes of all variables were checked.
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Descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimation models. to participate in a scheme was rated on a 5-point Likert scale and, under the assumption that the error terms are normally distributed, we can say that a standard probit model dominates the first equation and an ordered probit model dominates the second. A two-step conditional model was developed following Greene and Hensher (2010) , where the observed outcomes y ij are related to as follows:
where y i1 is the observed outcome of the selection model (i.e. stated willingness to continue vinegrowing by farmer i); y i2 is the observed outcome of the second model (i.e. stated intention to participate in the scheme by farmer i); and µ j are unknown threshold parameters to be estimated with 0 < µ 1 < µ 2 < · · · < µ j .
The primary aim of the analysis was to obtain consistent estimates of a vector of parameters β 1 and β 2 , by using observations from the selected sample. Given that both parts of the structured model are non-linear, the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is considered the most adequate choice (Luca and Perotti, 2011) .
The two equations need to be estimated simultaneously in order to account for sample selection which, in practice, means that for a particular farmer i, y i2 is not observed unless y i1 = 1. In MLE, the covariance of the error terms of the two equations p is not directly estimated (Luca and Perotti, 2011) , but the transformed correlation coefficient , based on Fisher's z transformation is estimated instead:
where, z is normally distributed, ln is the natural logarithm function and atanh is the inverse hyperbolic function (Fisher, 1915) . This transformation is preferred as for sample correlation it has a nearconstant variance for all values of p (Cox, 2008; Buis, 2011) .
The effect of the explanatory variable is measured in terms of marginal effect defined as partial change in the probability of the outcome caused by a change in an explanatory variable ceteris paribus (marginal effects).
In addition, a standard order probit model, with 5 outcomes, was estimated for each scheme and the results were compared to the selectivity-corrected models.
Results and discussion
3.1.
Descriptive statistics
The statistical analysis was performed using STATA 12 software. Table 4 shows the means of the variables used in the ordered probit models. Some variables were common for all models, while others were model specific.
The mean of the normalized variables on a scale from 1 to 10 shows that, on average, the majority of the participants' vineyards fall under the 'island vineyards' category. Also, for the investment aid scheme, the majority of farmers fall under the factor describing financial concerns (Financial imp). However, for the organic vine-growing scheme, the majority of farmers belong to the category of idealists (Idealists_org).
Regarding corruption, farmers' perceptions of its existence differs on average between the implementation of the two schemes, with 48% of the farmers believing it exists in the procedures for the investment aid scheme, whereas a smaller percentage (38%) thinks it is present in the implementation of the organic vine-growing scheme. Most participants (84%) found that the recession had had a negative impact on their vine-growing activities.
Estimated willingness to participating in subsidy schemes rates are shown in Table 5 . Overall, willingness to participate is higher for the investment aid scheme than for the scheme for organic practices.
3.2.
Estimation results
Two ordered probit models, one for vine-growers' participation in the investment aid scheme and one for vine-growers' participation in the organic farming scheme, were estimated. Each model was estimated with, and without, selectivity correction to identify any self-selection. (The variables used in the selection model and their descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix C, Tables C.1, C.2 and C.3. The estimated coefficients of the selection model are shown in Appendix C, Table C.4). We only found self-selection to be the case for the investment aid scheme. In both models, robust standard errors were estimated to account for potential heteroskedasticity. To assess the fit of the models, Wald statistic tests were carried out.
3.2.1.
Investment aid scheme Table 6 shows the results of the models estimating vine-growers' intention to participate in the investment aid scheme. The correlation coefficient ˆp 1 between the selection model and the ordered probit was statistically significant meaning that selectivity correction was needed. Therefore, the model chosen for discussion is the selectivity corrected one. The selection equation eliminated 44 observations, so the estimation of the probabilities was for the remaining 160 ones. Table 7 shows the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on each outcome of the model (marginal effects of the non-selectivity corrected model are shown in Appendix D Table D.1). As indicated in Tables 6 and 7 , farmers' intention to participate in the investment aid scheme is negatively influenced by their perception of corruption in the scheme's bureaucratic procedures. Thus, a one unit increase in farmers' perception of corruption on a 1-10 scale would lead to a 14% drop in their responding positively to participate in the scheme. Discussions with farmers led to the observation that corruption can be a serious issue when it comes to participating in the investment aid scheme and that the subsidy received from the scheme does not always compensate for the effort and the money needed to overcome corruption. Karanikolas and Martinos (2007) found that farmers believe there is an established relation of the scheme to clientelism with corruption being manifested in many stages of the participation procedure. Also, according to Sotiropoulos (2004) , state centralization is associated with slow procedures and ambiguous legal frameworks which may increase farmers' perception of corruption and restrict their participation in the scheme.
Changes in farmers' perception of the economic crisis have an impact on farmers' willingness to participate in the investment aid scheme. More specifically, if farmers' perception about the economic crisis impact is negative, the probability of the farmer being willing to participate in the scheme would be higher compared with those who do not perceive such an impact. The fact that a farm crisis can lead farmers to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the CAP to fund investment on their farms was also mentioned by Maye et al. (2009) who said that in times of crisis investing in diversification "becomes more significant as a business pathway" as it can offer farm businesses a "positive crisisrecovery strategy". Optimism for the future, as expected, was positively related with the probability of participating in the investment aid scheme as farmers who were more optimistic about the future were more likely to participate in the scheme that those who were less optimistic.
The first TPB (Financial_imp) factor is positively correlated to participation to the scheme. Results show that by increasing their evaluation of "Financial_imp" by 1 unit (e.g. from 6 to 7 in a 1-10 scale) the probability that the farmer answers "probably yes" or "definitely yes" to participate in the scheme Table 7 Marginal effects of explanatory variables on the outcomes of the probit model estimating vine-growers' intention to participate in the investment aid subsidy scheme with corrected sample selection.
Variable
Participating in the investment aid subsidy scheme increases by 7.91%. This factor also relates to social norms and farmers' social and occupational identities and the positive relation of these to participation in schemes agrees with the results of researchers like Dessein and Nevens (2007) and Burton et al. (2008) . It has also been mentioned by Jongeneel et al. (2008) that there is a relationship between perceived farming social identity and participation in multifunctional schemes. The factor describing perceived behavioural control was significantly and positively correlated, meaning that farmers who find it easy to acquire information, understand the law and collabo-rate with the authorities are more likely to participate (increase probabilities of positive outcomes by 7.91%). Previously, in England, Elliott et al. (2003) had also found that farmers perceived the procedures of applying to be complicated and those who find help, or think they did not need it, are more likely to apply for a subsidy. For the case of Greek farmers this result is also in accordance with other authors who have studied the relation of the investment aid to the ability to overcome the bureaucratic procedures and influence the authorities such as Papadopoulos (1997) and Karanikolas and Martinos (2007) .
Previous participation in the scheme was found to be statistically significant and had a positive influence on increasing the probability of participating in the scheme. Farmers who previously participated in the scheme were 17.8% more likely to be willing to participate again than those with no previous experience of participating in the scheme. This finding is similar to the findings of others on farmers' participation in Rural Development Schemes (e.g. Vanslembrouck et al., 2002) .
Regarding vine-growing systems, it was found that farmers with large areas of fragmented vineyards, or parts of wine-making estates, were keen on participating in the investment aid scheme. Only those with much larger vineyards were more likely to participate in the scheme, possibly due to their owners finding it easier to financially support an improvement plan. Farmers with other vinegrowing systems were not found to be very interested in participating in the investment aid scheme.
3.2.2.
Organic farming scheme Table 8 shows the results of the ordered probit model that estimated vine-growers' intention to participate in the organic subsidy scheme before and after the sample selection. Results of the selection model are shown in Appendix C Table C.4. The correlation coefficientˆp 2 between the ordered probit and selection model was not statistically significant, meaning that correction was not necessary to extract reliable results. Therefore, the model chosen for discussion here is a standard ordered probit model (see first column of Table 8 ). Table 9 shows the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on each outcome of the model. (Marginal effects of the selectively corrected model are presented in Appendix C Table C.1.) From the results shown in Tables 8 and 9 , we can see that the second TPB factor describing the importance of issues such as environ-mental and landscape protection (Idealists org) was, as expected, significantly and positively correlated with farmers' intention to participate in organic vine-growing. This result is similar to that of Burton et al. (2003) who found that environmental awareness increased the possibility of farmers adopting agrienvironmental schemes. In particular, it was found that having a unit's increase in the value of this factor increases the probability of a positive outcome (5 = definitely yes or 4 = probably yes) by 2.84%.
The factor describing perceived behavioural control (Control org) also has significant and positive correlation, meaning that farmers who are positive about dealing with authorities, or farmers who think that they can overcome institutional obstacles, are more likely to participate in the scheme. More specifically, the probability that farmers are willing to participate in the scheme increases by 5.60% with a one unit increase in farmers' perception of control. This result was expected, based on the original discussions with farmers, and generally agrees with Läpple (2010) and Hansson et al. (2012) who highlighted the influence of this kind of psychological factor on adoption of new measures.
As far as vine-growing systems are concerned, three systems have statistically significant coefficients. Traditional terraced vine-yards on the islands with low mechanization rates were negatively correlated with participation in the organic vine-growing scheme. The probability of a positive outcome decreases when respondents tend to be part of that vine-growing system.
Table 9
Marginal effects of explanatory variables on the outcomes of the probit model estimating vine-growers intention to participate in the subsidy scheme for organic farming. These findings concur with Papadopoulos and Papanikos (2005) who found that vine-growers on islands are not attracted to agri-environmental schemes. Modern, and profit-oriented, vineyards with high rates of mechanization in coastal areas were negatively correlated with participation in organic vine-growing. This result is in line with Oxouzi (2008) who found that farmers with profit-orientated vine-yards are less likely to adopt organic farming. In contrast, hill-side vineyards in mountain areas were positively associated with participation in the organic vine-growing scheme. Wine-making estates, part-time and hobby vineyards did not have statistically significant coefficients but this could be due to the nature of the scheme, as eligibility rules often exclude part-time farmers from receiving subsidies (Oxouzi, 2008) .
Previous participation in the scheme is an important factor in terms of influencing farmers' intentions to participate in the organic scheme. The probability of farmers being willing to participate was 33% higher for farmers who participated in the scheme before, than those who were not in the scheme.
Perception of corruption was not found to be significantly co-related to farmers' intentions to participate in the organic vine-growing scheme. Similarly, their perception of the impact of the economic recession and optimism for the future were not significantly co-related to the probability of participating in the scheme. Furthermore, after discussion with farmers, it was found that they believed that corruption does not have a significant effect on entry to the organic scheme as there is relatively little money involved. In addition, many vine-growers that want to be organic can be so without participating in the scheme and, therefore, they are not intimidated by corruption. As far as the economic recession is concerned, organic farming does not involve large investment and is not as highly related to the profitability of the vineyards as is the investment aid scheme. In addition, for those farmers that become organic for moral or ethical reasons, the current economic situation has little influence on their beliefs.
Farmers' age was found to be negatively related to their intention to participate in the organic vine growing scheme (p-value < 0.01) which is in accordance with other studies on adoption of organic farming (e.g. Anderson et al., 2005; Padel, 2008) .
Education level was found to not be associated with farmers' participation in the organic vine-growing scheme whereas based on previous research (e.g. Damianos and Giannakopoulos, 2002; Oxouzi, 2008) , it would be expected that the more educated farmers would be keener to adopt organic farming than others. However, it could be that, better educated farmers have a higher understanding of the constraints imposed by legislation and bureaucracy, and the associated difficulties of applying organic practices on farms, than the less educated ones.
Conclusions
In this paper, we discuss the impact of several factors on Greek vine-growers' decisions to participate in two voluntary RD schemes-namely the Investment Aid Scheme and the Organic Farming Scheme. These factors included perception of corruption, perception of the economic recession, farming systems and farmers' attitudes and beliefs.
Results indicated that perceived corruption in the implementation of the Rural Development Policy is an important negative driver for farmer participation especially for the Investment Aid Scheme. Also, psychological constraints play an important role in farmers' participation intentions, especially those related to Perceived Behavioural Control (i.e. access and interaction with the authorities). Farmers' perception of the current economic recession in Greece was found to be correlated positively with farmers' willingness to participate in the schemes. Regarding farming systems, only large estate vineyards had the intention to participate in the Investment Aid Scheme while, for the Organic Scheme, some farm types were more influential than others. Finally, participation was motivated by financially related factors and factors related to protection of the environment for the Investment Aid Scheme and the Organic Farming Scheme, respectively.
These findings indicate that there is a need for a range of policy solutions that would enhance vinegrowers' participation in RD schemes. Two main policy implications are derived from our analysis. First, that the strategies for RD scheme participation should include significant changes in the way RD schemes are administered (i.e. its design and implementation). The second is that there is a need for finding ways to facilitate effective communication between RD stakeholders, mainly the farmers and the policy makers. Several policy options can be suggested to nudge farmers to participate in RD schemes.
First, a large proportion of farmers perceive the government as corrupt. However, since the main way in which corruption is manifested is through the use of informal networking, farmers who believe that they have access to informal networks are more likely to participate in such schemes. Hence, there is a need for a fiscal framework that mitigates the factors providing grounds for corruption-such as complex legislation, red tape and state centralization-to reduce its negative perception by farmers.
For instance, the introduction of modern IT technologies, as well as ensuring anonymity in the initial stages of the application process for schemes, could help to reduce the perception of unfairness in the application process and the perceived need for networking. Additionally, a more controlled budget allocation combined with public information on its distribution amongst farmers and regions could build up trust in government. Also, assigning trained staff at the local administrative level could reduce farmers' potential interactions with external networks and lessen the idea that submitting an application is problematic (Elliott et al., 2003) .
Second, contrary to policy makers' beliefs on the linkage between reception and participation in schemes (Hellenic Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food, 2012), we found that farmers' would be more keen to participate in RD schemes if they perceive effects of the economic recession on viticulture to be negative, especially for the Investment Aid Scheme. The ongoing economic crisis has had an impact on other industries, which may have led farmers to reconsider the possibility of staying in farming and taking advantage of schemes that can help finance their businesses. Facilitating access to credit and easing repayment requirements, especially by small scale farmers who may find it more difficult to acquire investment capital (Ministry of Rural Development and Food, 2012) , may contribute to dealing with the financial crisis. At the administrative level, ensuring faster payment of subsidies could boost cash flow in the sector and reduce farmers' risk perception. Furthermore, the creation and support of marketing channels, through national and local strategies and interventions that would enforce the circulation of farm products, could provide advantages to farmers (against other employment categories) and increase their willingness to invest in their vine-yards.
Third, our findings indicate that the drivers for participation in the two schemes differ. Financial drivers are important for their participation in the Investment Aid Scheme, whereas non-financial aspects (i.e. idealism) are linked to participating in the Organic Farming Scheme. Also, scheme participation was correlated with certain farm types more than others. Our results indicate that different types of farmers (or farming systems) prefer different policies. Thus, some farmers would be attracted to policy mechanisms that encourage business development while other farmers would sign-up for policies that support the protection of the environment. In this context, it is useful to examine how future policies could accommodate this diversity. Our results indicate the necessity for splitting the Rural Development Programme into more targeted policies tailored to the varying farmers' beliefs and needs.
A further conclusion from this study is that the fewer psychological constraints farmers face in participating in a scheme, the more they are willing to participate in it as was also found in Läpple (2010) and Hansson et al. (2012) . Psychological constraints may relate to the social demands of farming life, the lifestyle choices in the LFAs and the interactions with the authorities. Policy response to these caveats may go beyond the framework of the Rural Development Programme and require a more spherical policy approach that encompasses infrastructure improvement, cultural and commercial development of rural areas in non-agricultural teams. Finally, the focus of future RD policies could be on: modernizing rural life; providing a range of social structure alternatives for rural populations; and facilitating farmer' access to the decision-making centres. This finding, however, also implies that knowledge and information provision is very important. Information could act as a method of reducing risk perception and can enable actions at the individual level by changing a person's attitudes. Further, psychological constraints could be overcome through the process of social education in combination with the appropriate incentives for scheme participation. Appendix C. Appendix D. 
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